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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
the court cannot confer; only the defendant can authorize another
to appear in his behalf.
CPLR 316: Mailing requirement interpreted.
In Gross v. Gross,31 a divorce action, plaintiff-wife sought sup-
port and maintenance. Unable to effectuate personal service, she
was granted an order to serve defendant by publication pursuant
to the procedures of CPLR 316. The court first concluded that it
was proper to assert in personam jurisdiction over the defendant
as a resident of New York since the parties were married here
and made their residence here. Although the defendant could not
be found, no evidence was submitted that he was a non-resident
and thus, a presumption of his residence continued.32  The court
then met a challenge that due process had not been fulfilled by
substituted service, concluding that publication afforded defendant
reasonable notice and a fair opportunity to be heard.33
This case may provide one of the few interpretations of 316's
mailing requirement. Under 316, where service is by publication
in a matrimonial action, a copy of the summons must be mailed
to the defendant. The standard by which such a mailing's effec-
tiveness is to be judged can possibly be gleaned from the provision
under which such mailing may be dispensed with by the court.
The section states that such mailing must be made "unless a place
where such person probably would receive mail cannot with due
diligence be ascertained." 34 This would seem to suggest that such
mailing as establishes a probability that it will reach the defendant
is sufficient. Here, the mailing of the summons to the husband in
care of his father was held to be satisfactory.
N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 7(c): Court of Appeals clarifies breadth
of suprene court's jurisdiction.
As a court of general original jurisdiction, the supreme court,
in the past, has been held to have subject matter jurisdiction over
all common-law actions 35 and all statutorily-established actions un-
less the Legislature in creating the latter specifically negatives this
result.3 6 The 1962 amendment to section 7 of the judiciary article
of the New York Constitution has prompted recent review of the
3156 Misc. 2d 286, 288 N.Y.S2d 674 (Sup. Ct King's County 1968).
Harris v. Harris, 83 App. Div. 123, 82 N.Y.S. 568 (2d Dep't 1903).
-33McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); Rawstorne v. Maguire, 265
N.Y. 204, 192 N.E. 294 (1934).
34CPLR 316(b) (emphasis added).
35 In re Steinway, 159 N.Y. 250, 255-58, 53 N.E. 1103, 1104-05 (1899).38Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 166, 225
N.E.2d 503, 506, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793, 798 (1967).
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